The Legal Recognition of the Rights of Nature: Perspectives from the Global South

How can the rights of nature move from constitutional text and court judgments into practice? Ramiro Ávila and Viviana González compare Ecuador’s constitutional approach with Colombia’s Atrato River case, examining the role of communities, the obstacles to implementation, and the limits of legal recognition alone.
Credit: Lucas Chizzali / Unsplash

What changes when a river or an ecosystem is recognized as a subject of rights? And what does it take to make those rights effective? In this webinar, CLX’s Carlos Andrés Baquero-Díaz speaks with Ramiro Ávila, then a justice of Ecuador’s Constitutional Court, and Viviana González of SIEMBRA about the experiences of Ecuador and Colombia.

Ecuador’s 2008 Constitution expressly recognizes the rights of nature. Ávila explains how this recognition draws both on Indigenous relationships with Pachamama and on legal and scientific understandings of nature’s life cycles, structures, and functions. Yet the Constitution also treats natural resources as state property and permits extractive activities. For Ávila, that tension helps explain why constitutional recognition has empowered social movements while courts and public policy have been slower to protect nature in practice.

Colombia has followed a different path: courts have recognized the rights of particular natural entities through individual cases. González discusses the Constitutional Court’s Atrato River judgment, T-622 of 2016. Communities in the river basin sought protection amid illegal gold mining, mercury contamination, deforestation, inadequate sanitation, and armed conflict. Their case also showed that the river is inseparable from their transport, daily life, cultural practices, and identity. The Court recognized the Atrato as a subject of rights and called for its protection and restoration.

The speakers focus on the difficult work that follows recognition. González describes the continuing pressures on the Atrato and the need for community participation, effective legal representation, and public policies suited to the river’s circumstances. Ávila examines how legal training centered on property and narrow readings of statutes can prevent lawyers and judges from understanding ecological relationships. Both argue that court decisions need the support of social movements, local knowledge, and other fields of study to produce lasting change.

Highlights

Ecuador’s 2008 Constitution recognizes nature’s rights to the maintenance and regeneration of its life cycles, structure, functions, and evolutionary processes. Ávila points to a tension within the same legal framework: nature is also treated as a source of resources that the state may authorize others to extract. He argues that extractive policies and a legal culture that views land and water as property have often prevailed over the Constitution’s recognition of nature as a rights-bearing subject.

González explains that the right to a healthy environment often protects nature because people need healthy environmental conditions. Rights of nature ask what an ecosystem itself needs to maintain its cycles and relationships. The Atrato case also brings in biocultural rights: the well-being of the river and the rights, culture, and ways of life of the communities along it cannot be understood in isolation.

González describes illegal gold mining and mercury contamination alongside deforestation, inadequate water and sanitation services, and armed conflict. She also explains the river’s place in community life: it is a route for travel and a setting for bathing, cooking, social ties, spiritual practices, and identity. Those relationships helped ground the Constitutional Court’s recognition of the Atrato as a subject of rights.

González says that Colombian decisions have identified rights and appointed guardians, but questions remain about the legal routes available to enforce those rights and how established ideas of legal personality apply to nature. Ávila adds that lawyers and judges are often trained to treat nature as property or an object of regulation. He urges them to engage with Indigenous knowledge and fields such as biology and hydrology when assessing an ecosystem’s needs.

Ávila points to Ecuador’s constitutional provision allowing any person, community, people, or nationality to demand enforcement of nature’s rights. González explains that Colombia’s judgments have instead designated legal representatives or guardians for particular entities. In the Atrato case, representation involves both public authorities and community delegates, raising practical questions about who speaks for the river and how decisions are made.

At the time of the webinar, González reported that illegal mining continued despite the judgment. She describes economic incentives, armed groups, weaknesses in state control, and the broader framework governing mining as obstacles to implementation. Restoring a damaged river also requires more than a declaration of rights: it calls for sustained measures that address the river and the communities’ relationship with it together.

González cautions against treating the Atrato decision as a formula for every ecosystem. Its reasoning reflects the particular history, communities, and biocultural relationships of the river basin. She recommends that decision-makers listen to local communities and adapt legal protections to the context. Ávila likewise stresses support from social movements and knowledge beyond law; without people working to implement a decision, recognition can remain on paper.

The conversation is useful for community advocates, litigators, judges, researchers, and students working on environmental justice or rights of nature. It offers two distinct routes to legal recognition and a practical question for anyone considering a similar case: who will carry the decision forward, and what knowledge, community participation, and public action will be needed to protect the ecosystem?

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Climate litigation moves quickly, and case law referenced here reflects the state of play at the time of publication. Where a resource is part of an ongoing series or learning kit, later installments may reflect more recent developments.

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